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False Claims Act Liability for Higher Education Institutions: Analyzing Claim Against
Charlotte School of Law and Infilaw Systems
Brian C. Munsie*
I.

Introduction

In mid-August, prior to the beginning of the 2017 fall semester, the Charlotte School of
Law (CSOL) announced that it would be closing.1 The announcement came in the wake of public
disclosure of shortcomings in the school’s ability to operate effectively.2 The American Bar
Association (ABA) Section of Legal Education and Admission to the Bar published notice that it
was placing CSOL on probationary status for failing to comply with several ABA standards,
including standards for bar passage and admissions.3 The school subsequently lost its ability to
receive federal funding for student tuition, and also lost its license to operate in the state, thereby
forcing CSOL to close.4 The school is now facing a plethora of lawsuits filed by students and
faculty.5
One lawsuit the school is facing is a False Claims Act (FCA) suit filed by a former teacher,
Professor Barbara Bernier, alleging that the school violated the FCA for allowing students to
submit claims for federal funds under Title IV of the Higher Education Act (HEA) while failing
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Stephanie Francis Ward, Feds Started Criminal Investigation of Charlotte School of Law, According to Civil Filing,
ABA J. (Aug. 29, 2017, 5:44 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/feds_started_criminal_investigation_of_
charlotte_school_of_law_according_to/.
2
Ann Doss Helms, Charlotte School of Law Put on Probation by American Bar Association, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER
(Nov. 17, 2016, 8:51 AM), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/education/article115339503.html.
3
Id.
4
Ward, supra note 1.
5
See, e.g., Stephanie Francis Ward, Student Lawsuits Against Charlotte School of Law Consolidated, ABA J. (Oct.
17, 2017, 12:54 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/student_lawsuits_against_charlotte_school_of_law
_consolidated.
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to comply with certain requirements.6 Professor Bernier filed the qui tam7 action under seal in the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida in June 2016, a few months prior to
her voluntarily leaving the school.8 The complaint was unsealed in August 2017 after the United
States Attorney’s Office filed a notice that it would not intervene. 9 The United States Attorney’s
motion to unseal the lawsuit gave no indication whether the decision to not intervene was based
on lack of evidence against the school, but it stated that the investigation “will continue.”10 It is
unclear whether the government’s investigation into the school is ongoing, but Professor Bernier
as the relator and whistleblower will presumably continue pursuing the action.11 Her complaint
alleges that the school manipulated bar exam and employment statistics by offering students who
were unlikely to pass the exam a monetary stipend to forego taking the exam. 12 Additionally,
Professor Bernier alleges that CSOL dramatically transformed the nature of the school in terms of
faculty and resources after obtaining full accreditation,13 and downwardly adjusted minimum GPA
requirements in order to retain failing students who otherwise should have been academically
dismissed.14
This Comment will discuss the current FCA lawsuit filed against CSOL and Infilaw, its
parent corporation, and address whether non-compliance with accreditation standards following
entry into a Program Participation Agreement (PPA) should be a basis for a valid claim under the

6

Elizabeth Olson, Federal Inquiry of Charlotte Law School Is Disclosed by Suit, N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 13, 2017)
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/13/business/dealbook/charlotte-law-school-federal-inquiry.html.
7
A qui tam action is a lawsuit brought by a private citizen (popularly called a “whistleblower”) against a person or
company who is believed to have violated the law in performance of a contract with the government or in violation of
a government regulation. Qui tam action, LAW.COM, https://dictionary.law.com/Default.aspx?selected=1709 (last
visited Apr. 19, 2018). Qui tam suits are brought “for the government as well as for the plaintiff.” Id.
8
Olson, supra note 6.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Ward, supra note 1.
13
Complaint at ¶ 53, United States ex rel. Bernier v. Infilaw Corp., 2016 WL 9526145 (M.D. Fla. June 6, 2016) (No.
16-970), http://www.abajournal.com/files/bernier_v._Infilaw_2016.pdf.
14
Id. at ¶ 69.
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FCA. Part II will discuss the history of CSOL and Infilaw, the background of the FCA, and the
requirements of both Title IV of the HEA and PPAs that schools must enter into with the
Department of Education in order to be able to receive federal funding. Part III will address the
current state of FCA liability for higher education institutions based on theories of non-compliance
with statutes, regulations, and promises made under the PPA. It will focus on the current circuit
split as to the viability of the false-certification theory of liability under the FCA. Recently, the
Supreme Court imposed liability based on the false-certification theory in the medical context,15
but the effect of that holding on educational institutions is unclear. Part IV will analyze the facts
of the lawsuit filed by Professor Bernier against CSOL and Infilaw, and will analyze whether the
complaint states a valid claim of FCA liability. This Comment posits that, while the complaint
may not have pled with specificity the alleged “bad faith” that is normally required under a preformation false certification theory of liability, Professor Bernier should be held to the more lenient
standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) pleading some courts have applied. But even if
the complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to prove bad faith entry into the PPA, she should be
allowed to continue based on the theory of post-formation false certification. Part V briefly
concludes.
II.

Background

A. The Infilaw System and CSOL
The Infilaw System is a consortium of private, independently-operated for-profit law
schools in the United States.16 Infilaw is owned primarily by Sterling Partners, a Chicago-based
private equity firm, and is headquartered in Naples, Florida.17 It was founded by Sterling Partners

15

See Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S.Ct. 1989 (2016).
THE INFILAW SYSTEM, www.infilaw.com (last visited Feb. 16, 2018).
17
Id.
16

3

in 2004, shortly after Sterling’s purchase of the Florida Coastal School of Law.18 Infilaw then
established two other for-profit law schools—Arizona Summit Law School, located in Phoenix
Arizona, in 2004, and CSOL in 2006.19 The company’s approach has been to mostly target students
who do not qualify for admission to top law schools,20 including many minorities,21 because of
low grade-point averages and LSAT scores.22 The schools supposedly emphasize providing more
feedback than other law schools, and focus on “hands on” learning.23 With the closing of CSOL,
the consortium currently consists of two ABA-accredited law schools, Arizona Summit Law
School in Phoenix, Arizona, and Florida Coastal School of Law in Jacksonville, Florida.24
Arizona Summit Law School has recently experienced operating troubles of its own,
however, being placed on probation by the ABA and ranking second-to-last out of all ABA
approved schools in “ultimate” bar passage rates.25 Ultimate bar passage rates show the percentage
of graduates who passed the bar within two years of graduation.26 Just sixty percent of the 2015

18

Zach Warren, For-profit Law Schools on the Rise, CORP. COUNS. (Oct. 21, 2013), https:
//www.law.com/insidecounsel/2013/10/21/for-profit-law-schools-on-the-rise/.
19
Ashby Jones, Private-Equity Group’s for-Profit Law School Plan Draws Critics, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 20, 2013),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/privateequity-group8217s-forprofit-law-school-plan-draws-critics-1382312687?mg=
prod/accounts-wsj.
20
U.S. News & World Report ranks 197 fully accredited law schools based on a weighted average of several factors
including quality assessment, selectivity, placement success, and faculty resources. Robert Morse & Kenneth Hines,
Methodology: 2018 Best Law Schools Rankings, U.S. NEWS WORLD REP. (Mar. 13, 2017, 9:30 PM),
https://www.usnews.com/education/best-graduate-schools/articles/law-schools-methodology. U.S. News assigns a
numerical rank to the top three-fourths of law schools, while the bottom quarter are listed as Rank Not Published. Id.
CSOL was unranked due to its probationary status. Id. Arizona Summit Law School and Florida Coastal School of
Law were both listed as Rank Not Published.
Best Law Schools, U.S. NEWS WORLD REP.,
https://www.usnews.com/best-graduate-schools/top-law-schools/law-rankings/page+7 (last visited Apr. 19, 2018).
21
For example, Professor Bernier alleges that CSOL recruited heavily from Livingstone College in Salisbury, North
Carolina, a historically black college, admitting approximately forty Livingstone students in 2013 and fifty in 2014.
See Complaint, supra note 13, at ¶ 60. Both sets of students allegedly failed at extremely high rates with most not
making it through a second semester. Id.
22
Jones, supra note 19.
23
According to Peter Goplerud, the president of Infilaw’s consulting arm, one “informal goal” of the school’s is for
students to obtain at least 400 hours of work experience prior to graduation. Id.
24
Our Schools, THE INFILAW SYSTEM, http://www.infilaw.com/our-schools-2/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2018).
25
Anne Ryman, Arizona Summit Law School Has Nation’s Second-lowest Bar Passage Rate, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Mar.
23, 2018), https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/arizona-education/2018/03/23/arizona-summit-law-schoolsecond-lowest-bar-passage-rates-country/450085002/.
26
Id.
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Arizona Summit graduates had passed the bar, while the average of all other schools was eightyeight percent.27 Additionally, a FCA suit brought against the school by two former professors,
making similar allegations to those in the Bernier complaint, was recently unsealed in March
2018.28

While the suit was voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiffs in February, a lawyer

representing the former professors said his clients stand by their allegations against the school
despite their decision to not move forward with the suit.29 Florida Coastal School of Law has also
faced recent troubles, ranking among the lowest in bar passage rates in the state and failing federal
gainful-employment ratings—which signals graduates’ inability to manage student loan debt based
on their post-graduation earnings.30 The ABA sent the school a letter notifying its administrators
that the school was out of compliance with accreditation standards, but the school has not yet been
placed on probation or sanctioned.31
CSOL obtained provisional accreditation32 from the ABA in 2008 and full accreditation in
2011.33 The ABA performed a full site inspection of the school in 2014.34 Since obtaining full
accreditation in 2011, students of CSOL have been eligible to apply for and obtain federal
financing for their legal education.35 Within three months of becoming fully accredited and site

27

Id.
Karen Sloan, Second Law Prof Whistleblower Suit Against InfiLaw Unsealed, DAILY BUS. REV. (Apr. 4, 2018),
https://www.law.com/dailybusinessreview/2018/04/04/second-law-prof-whistleblower-suit-against-infilawunsealed/.
29
Id.
30
Andrew Kreighbaum, Accreditors’ Scrutiny of Florida Law School Renews Concerns Over Oversight, INSIDE
HIGHER ED (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/11/15/accreditors-scrutiny-florida-lawschool-renews-concerns-over-oversight.
31
Id.
32
The ABA grants provisional approval to applying schools who establish that they are “in substantial compliance
with each of the Standards” and present “a reliable plan for bringing the school into full compliance within three years
after receiving provisional approval.” The Law School Accreditation Process, ABA SEC. LEGAL EDUC. ADMISSIONS
B.,
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/
council_reports_and_resolutions/2016_the_law_school_accreditation_process.authcheckdam.pdf.
33
Complaint, supra note 13, at ¶ 51.
34
Id. The ABA conducts regular site visits of fully approved law schools every seventh year. Law School Site Visits,
AM. BAR ASS’N, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/accreditation/law_school_site_visits.html
(last visited Feb. 16, 2018).
35
Complaint, supra note 13, at ¶ 52.
28
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certified, the Bernier complaint alleges that the school began instituting buy-outs of faculty and
staff in order to cut costs, which dramatically altered the nature of the school as compared to when
it obtained accreditation.36 Following the 2014 site visit, the ABA made several findings of
concern about the school’s operation in a report to the school.37 The report stated the school was
out of compliance with several ABA standards for law schools, including “its ability to provide a
rigorous program that prepares students for admission to the bar and its application of reasonably
high standards for admission.”38 Further reports showed the school was troubled with exceedingly
high drop-out rates and low bar-passage rates among first-time takers.39 But despite the school’s
failure to come in to compliance, the ABA did not place the school on probation until November
2016, two and a half years after issues of noncompliance were first discovered. 40 Subsequently,
the Department of Education removed the school’s Title IV eligibility, and CSOL students were
no longer able to receive Title IV funds for their education.41 Ultimately the school’s license to
operate in the state of North Carolina expired, and CSOL was forced to close in August 2017, just
weeks prior to the start of the fall semester.42
B. The FCA
The FCA, often called the Lincoln Law, was signed in 1863 by President Abraham Lincoln
in response to deception and fraud practiced on the government in its purchasing of horses,
weapons, ammunition, and other goods needed for the Civil War.43 The FCA imposes liability on

36

Id. at ¶ 53.
Clare McCann, A Play-By-Play of Charlotte School of Law’s Closure, NEW AMERICA (Aug. 23, 2017),
https://www.newamerica.org/education-policy/edcentral/csl-part-one/.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Elizabeth Olson, For-Profit Charlotte School of Law Closes, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com
/2017/08/15/business/dealbook/for-profit-charlotte-school-of-law-closes.html.
43
Harry Litman, ‘Lincoln’s law’: The Most Important Supreme Court Case Under the Radar, PITTSBURGH POSTGAZETTE (Jun. 13, 2016), http://www.post-gazette.com/opinion/Op-Ed/2016/06/13/Lincoln-s-law-The-Supreme37
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any person or entity that knowingly makes, or causes another to make, any false or fraudulent
claim for payment to the government.44

“Knowingly” is defined in the statute as “actual

knowledge,” “deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information,” or “reckless disregard
of the truth or falsity of the information,” and requires “no proof of specific intent to defraud.”45
The statute has been amended several times since its enactment to make it more effective.46
Violators of the FCA are subject to a fine between $5000–10,000 per violation, treble damages,
and attorney’s fees and costs to successful whistleblowers who bring claims on behalf of the
government.47
The statute contains a qui tam provision which allows private individuals, known as
“relators,” to bring a lawsuit on behalf of the government against a party who has defrauded the
government by a false claim.48 The provision allows any person or entity with evidence of fraud
against federal programs or contracts which induced the government to wrongly pay out a claim
to sue the wrongdoer in the name of the United States.49 A qui tam action must be filed under seal
in a district court with jurisdiction over the matter, and the complaint and its contents are kept
confidential until the seal is lifted.50 Additionally, a copy of the complaint and a written disclosure
containing all of the material evidence of fraud the relator possesses must be served on the United
States Attorney General and the United States Attorney for the district where the action is filed.51

Court-will-decide-whether-to-leave-in-place-a-robust-defense-against-fraud-passed-during-the-CivilWar/stories
/201606130010.
44
31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2016).
45
Id. § 3729(b).
46
See infra notes 55–59 and accompanying text.
47
Id. § 3729(a)(1), (3).
48
31 U.S.C. § 3730(b).
49
False Claims Act/Qui Tam FAQ, NATIONAL WHISTLEBLOWER CENTER, http://www.whistleblowers.org/resources
/faq-page/false-claims-actqui-tam-faq#what%20is%20false (last visited Nov. 2, 2017).
50
Id.
51
Id.
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The government may choose to intervene in the lawsuit and take over the action, but if the
government does not intervene the relator is permitted to proceed with the suit.52
The FCA has become the government’s “primary litigation tool” in combatting fraud
against it.53 Both the judicial decisions and legislative history of the Act show a preference to
extend liability broadly. In 1968, the Supreme Court extended the reach of the FCA to “all
fraudulent attempts to cause the Government to pay out sums of money.”54 Then in 1986 Congress
amended the Act to broaden the ability for relators to bring a claim and increase the financial
incentives available to successful relators.55 The amendment allowed relators to bring FCA actions
even if the government was already aware of the fraud if the relator was the original source of the
information.56 Congress further amended the Act in 2009 through the Fraud Enforcement and
Recovery Act (FERA), which was enacted to enhance the government’s ability to combat financial
fraud following the 2008 financial crisis, establishment of the Troubled Asset Relief Program, and
increased economic stimulus spending.57 But FERA also added a materiality element to the FCA
by requiring that a false record or statement be “material to a false or fraudulent claim.”58 The
FCA defines “material” as “having a natural tendency to influence, or be capable of influencing,
the payment or receipt of money or property.”59

52

Id.
United States ex rel. Steury v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 625 F.3d 262, 267 (5th Cir. 2010).
54
United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228, 233 (1968). The question before the Court was whether the FCA
applied to a loan application submitted to a federal agency which contained false information. Id. at 229. The Court
found that the congressional debates at the time the act was passed suggested the Act was “intended to reach all types
of fraud, without qualification, that might result in financial loss to the Government.” Id. at 232.
55
False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153 (current version codified at 31 U.S.C.
§ 3729 (2016)).
56
Id.
57
Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 386, 123 Stat. 1617 (codified at 31 U.S.C. §
3729 (2016). See also 155 CONG REC. E1090-03 (daily ed. May 7, 2009) (statement of Rep. Dingell).
58
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B).
59
Id. § 3729(b)(4).
53
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Since 2009, the Department of Justice has recovered over $31 billion in settlements and
judgements from FCA cases, recovering over $4.7 billion in fiscal year 2016 alone.60 Of the $4.7
billion recovered in 2016, $2.9 billion related to actions originally brought by relators under qui
tam provisions, and the government paid out $519 million to such private individuals.61 The
majority of those actions involved claims against the healthcare industry, including drug
companies, hospitals, nursing homes, and physicians.62 The Department also secured a significant
amount of recoveries involving the financial industry from cases of housing and mortgage fraud
in connection with federally insured residential mortgages.63 In recent years, however, there has
been an increase in FCA litigation against for-profit schools that allegedly participated in
fraudulent schemes to secure federal education funds.64 The increase in claims against for-profit
schools follows the increased awareness of the predatory nature and educational shortcomings of
these schools.
There are two categories of false claims recognized by courts under the FCA: (1) factually
false claims and (2) legally false claims.65 A factually false claim occurs when a claimant makes
misrepresentations as to the goods or services it actually provides to the government. 66 A legally
false claim, also called false certification, occurs when a claimant falsely certifies compliance with
a statute or regulation where compliance is a condition of government payment. 67 Legally false

See Dep’t of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, Justice Department over $4.7 Billion from False Claims Act Cases in
Fiscal Year 2016, JUSTICE.GOV (Dec. 14, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-47billion-false-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2016.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
“For example, the second largest for-profit education company in the country, Education Management Corp., paid
the United States $52.6 million to resolve allegations that it unlawfully recruited students, engaged in deceptive and
misleading recruiting practices, and falsely certified compliance with Title IV of the Higher Education Act . . . .” Id.
65
United States ex rel. Wilkins v. United Health Group, Inc., 659 F.3d 295, 305 (3d Cir. 2011).
66
Id.
67
Id. (“[A] legally false claim is based on a ‘false certification’ theory of liability.”) (citing Rodriguez v. Our Lady of
Lourdes Med. Ctr., 552 F.3d 297, 303 (3d Cir. 2008)).
60

9

claims can be based on either express or implied false certifications.68 Under the “express false
certification theory,” a claimant is liable for falsely certifying compliance with a statute or
regulation which is a prerequisite to receiving government payment.69

The “implied false

certification theory,” however, finds a claimant liable for submitting claims for government
payment without disclosing non-compliance with statutes or regulations that would affect
eligibility to receive payment.70 Implied false certification is based on the common-law definition
of fraud encompassing misrepresentations by omission.71
C. The Higher Education Act and Program Participation Agreements
Under Title IV of the HEA, the federal government operates several programs that provide
educational funds to students to enable them to meet the financial burdens of higher education.72
Programs providing assistance include the Federal Pell Grant, the Federal Family Education Loan
Program, the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program, the Federal Perkins Loan, and the
Graduate Plus Loan.73 Students are eligible to obtain funds through federal programs only if they
attend a qualifying school.74 To qualify, Title IV of the HEA requires schools to enter into PPAs
with the Secretary of the Department of Education.75 In a PPA, the school agrees to comply with
all statutory requirements of Title IV, any regulatory provisions promulgated thereunder, and any
other arrangements, agreements, and limitations entered into under the authority of Title IV.76 The

68

Id.
Id.
70
Id. (noting that the “implied false certification theory of liability is premised ‘on the notion that the act of submitting
a claim for reimbursement itself implies compliance with governing federal rules that are a precondition to payment’”)
(quoting Mikes v. Strauss, 274 F.3d 687, 699 (2d Cir. 2001).
71
See Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S.Ct. 1989, 1999 (2016).
72
20 U.S.C. §§ 1070–1099d (2016).
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
20 U.S.C. § 1094(a).
76
Id.; 34 C.F.R. § 668.14(b)(1) (2017).
69
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institution must also be accredited by the applicable accrediting agency. 77 The Department of
Education does not accredit schools directly, but the Secretary of Education approves accrediting
agencies for different educational programs, who in turn set independent accreditation standards.78
Once a school is qualified to receive federal funds, its students are eligible to apply to receive full
financing for their education through federal programs.79
III.

Applying the FCA to Educational Institutions

Due to the predatory recruitment tactics and fraudulent schemes that have plagued the forprofit educational industry in recent years, there has been an increase in FCA suits brought against
for-profit higher educational institutions.80 But because a claim under the FCA involves allegations
of “fraud,” pleadings under the FCA must meet the heightened pleading requirements of Civil
Procedure Rule 9(b).81 Courts have consistently applied Rule 9(b) to complaints filed under the
scope of the FCA.82 Courts have differed, however, on the theories of FCA liability that can be
extended to educational institutions.
A. Heightened Pleading Requirements
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”83 This standard “does not
require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”84 The complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”85 A claim cannot survive a

77

34 C.F.R. § 600.4(a)(5)(i) (2017).
Thomas M. Cooley Law School v. American Bar Ass’n, 459 F.3d 705, 707 (6th Cir. 2006).
79
See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
80
See DOJ, supra note 60.
81
FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
82
See United State ex rel. Clausen v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 290 F.3d 1301, 1309 (11th Cir. 2002).
83
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
84
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
85
Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (2007)).
78
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motion to dismiss where allegations are merely “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation
of the elements of a cause of action.”86 The plausibility standard requires a plaintiff to allege facts
sufficient to allow a court to reasonably infer that the defendant’s alleged misconduct was
unlawful.87
Because they involve fraud, actions arising under the FCA are additionally subject to the
heightened pleading standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).88 The heightened pleading
standards under Rule 9(b) are a supplement, not a replacement, to the Rule 8(a) standards that
apply to all pleadings.89 Rule 9(b) applies to actions where a plaintiff alleges fraud or mistake, and
requires a plaintiff alleging fraud to “state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud,”
but allows scienter to be alleged generally.90 The purposes of heightened pleading are: (1) to ensure
“that the defendant has sufficient information to formulate a defense by putting it on notice of the
conduct complained of;” (2) “to protect defendants from frivolous suits;” (3) “to eliminate fraud
actions in which all facts are learned after discovery;” and (4) to protect “defendants from harm to
their goodwill and reputation.”91 Rule 9(b) is generally satisfied if the complaint establishes:
(1) precisely what statements were made in what documents or oral representations
or what omissions were made, and (2) the time and place of each such statement
and the person responsible for making (or, in the case of omissions, not making)
same, and (3) the content of such statements and the manner in which they misled
the plaintiff, and (4) what the defendants obtained as a consequence of the fraud.92

86

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Id. at 556; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
88
See United State ex rel. Clausen v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 290 F.3d 1301, 1309 (11th Cir. 2002).
89
Id.
90
Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
91
Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 784 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States ex rel.
Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Ga., Inc. 755 F. Supp. 1055, 1056–57 (S.D.
Ga 1990)).
92
Clausen, 290 F.3d at 1310 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Ziemba v. Cascade Int’l, Inc., 256 F.3d 1194, 1202 (11th Cir.
2001)).
87
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To serve the purposes of heightened pleading, the relator must provide “some indicia of reliability”
to support the allegations that the defendant submitted a false claim.93
In applying this standard to the FCA cases brought against educational institutions, there
is little difficulty with providing particularity that a claim was submitted to the government
because the claims submitted were requests from students for federal loans. Instead, the facts that
must be alleged with particularity are those showing the defendant’s false statements, which
ultimately led the government to pay amounts it did not owe. 94 For example, in Urquilla-Diaz v.
Kaplan University, the Eleventh Circuit found the relator met the requirements of Rule 9(b) for an
FCA claim based on a violation of the Department of Education’s regulation banning incentive
compensation for admissions employees where the relator pled specific instances of salaries being
adjusted based on numbers of enrollments.95 The court, however, affirmed the dismissal of the
claim that the school falsely certified that students were making satisfactory progress as a result of
a grade inflation scheme because the relator failed to provide specific instances of students who
would not have been making satisfactory progress but for the scheme.96
B. False Certification Theory
As noted previously, legally false claims under the FCA based on a theory of false
certification can be either express or implied.97 The relevant certification of compliance must be
both a “prerequisite to obtaining a government benefit” and the “sine qua non of receipt of
government funding.”98 In United States ex rel. Hendow v. University of Phoenix, the Ninth Circuit
recognized the viability of a FCA claim against the University of Phoenix, a for-profit entity,

93

Id. at 1311.
Uquilla-Diaz v. Kaplan University, 780 F.3d 1039, 1045 (11th Cir. 2015).
95
Id.
96
Id. at 1055.
97
See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
98
Urquilla-Diaz, 780 F.3d at 1053.
94
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predicated on an express false certification theory.99 Relators, former enrollment counselors at the
school, alleged that the University knowingly made false promises that it would comply with the
incentive compensation ban required by the PPA.100 They further alleged that the University
falsely certified compliance with the ban each year while knowingly violating the requirement;
that, coupled with later claims for payment of Title IV funds, constituted false claims under the
FCA.101
In reversing the district court’s dismissal of the case for failure to state a claim, the Ninth
Circuit accepted false certification as a viable theory of FCA liability and stated four essential
elements: (1) a false statement or fraudulent course of conduct, (2) made with scienter, (3) that
was material, causing (4) the government to pay out money or forfeit moneys due.102 The court
found that all of the essential elements were met and allowed the case to proceed.103 In articulating
the necessity of alleging an actual false claim rather than a mere regulatory violation, the court
stressed that it is the false certification of compliance that creates liability when certification is
required prior to obtaining the government benefit.104
The court found that the falsity element was met due to the University’s alleged violation
of the incentive compensation ban because it had expressly agreed to comply with the ban (as well
as all other statutory and regulatory requirements) in the PPA.105 As for the scienter element, the
court found the element satisfied based on the allegations that University staff openly bragged
about perpetrating a fraud and established procedures to deceive the government.106 The court
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found the materiality element was satisfied because eligibility to receive funds under Title IV is
explicitly conditioned on compliance with all requirements contained in the PPA, including the
incentive compensation ban.107 Notably, the court found that, in the context of Title IV and the
HEA, any distinction between conditions of participation and conditions of payment was
irrelevant, and all promises to comply with a PPA are conditions of payment.108 Finally, the court
found that the relators properly alleged submission of claims to the government through a variety
of requests for student funding.109
The Ninth Circuit’s holding in Hendow is significant because the court extended FCA
liability to the University based on allegedly fraudulent conduct that was committed after entry
into the PPA. While the court stated both that “mere regulatory violations do not give rise to a
viable FCA action,”110 and that “false claims must in fact be false when made,”111 the court based
its finding on the University’s later failure to honor its agreement to comply with the ban when it
entered into the PPA.112 The court stated that the claim was an express false certification because
the signed, written PPA was an “express statement of compliance.”113 But the court did not look
to whether the statement of compliance was false at the time the school entered into the PPA.114
Thus, it appears that the claimant’s state of mind and intention at the time it enters into the PPA
are irrelevant to the court’s analysis.
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In Urquilla-Diaz v. Kaplan University, the Eleventh Circuit expressly adopted the Ninth
Circuit’s false certification theory.115 This case involved a consolidated qui tam action brought by
three relators against a for-profit educational institution alleging the school falsely certified
compliance with federal statutes and regulations in order to receive financial aid funds.116 The
court noted that the mere disregard of regulations or improper internal practices cannot be a basis
for FCA liability under section 3729(a)(1)(A) “unless, as a result of such acts, the [defendant]
knowingly ask[ed] the Government to pay amounts it does not owe.”117 But the court stated that
under section 3729(a)(1)(B), a defendant may be liable where a relator shows that (1) “the
defendant made a false record or statement for the purpose of getting a false claim paid or approved
by the government,” and (2) “the defendant’s false record or statement caused the government to
actually pay a false claim, either to the defendant itself, or to a third party.”118 Therefore, to meet
the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b), a relator must allege, with particularity, that false
statements or a fraudulent course of conduct actually led the government to pay out money it did
not owe.119
The Eleventh Circuit went on to reverse the district court’s dismissal of the relator’s claim
based on the school’s violation of the incentive compensation ban, but the court affirmed the
dismissal of claims based on other violations, including allegedly using a grade inflation scheme
to falsely certify students as making satisfactory progress and violating the accreditation
requirement under 34 C.F.R. § 600.5(a)(6).120 The relators alleged that the school was improperly
paying incentive-based compensation to recruiters, while falsely certifying in a yearly letter to the
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Department of Education that it was in compliance with the ban.121 The court found that the relators
met the heightened pleading standard for showing a violation of the incentive compensation ban
by including specific facts about four former employees whose salaries were adjusted based on the
number of enrollments secured.122
The relators further alleged that the school engaged in a practice of inflating students’
grades in order to certify that they were making satisfactory progress, and used falsified documents
to obtain accreditation.123 Under 34 C.F.R. § 668.34, “an institution must establish a reasonable
satisfactory academic progress policy for determining whether an otherwise eligible student is
making satisfactory academic progress in his or her educational program and may receive
assistance under [T]itle IV, HEA programs.”124

The relator alleged Kaplan violated the

Department of Education’s “satisfactory progress” regulation by engaging in a grade inflation
scheme to falsely certify students as making satisfactory progress who otherwise would have been
failing.125 The court noted that grade inflation could lead to a FCA violation where a school
certified that a student was making satisfactory progress when he or she was not.126 The court
found, however, that the relator had failed to plead specific instances of students who would not
have been making satisfactory progress without the scheme, and affirmed the dismissal.127
In evaluating the claim based on accreditation, the court stated that false statements made
to an accreditation agency could lead to FCA liability because whether a school is accredited is
material to the government’s decision to pay Title IV funds.128 The relator alleged that Kaplan
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submitted backdated studies and budgets “as well as other ‘forged’ or ‘false’ documents” to its
accrediting agency.129 The court affirmed the dismissal, however, because it found that the relator
had failed to plead particular facts sufficient to infer a plausible connection between the school’s
allegedly false statements and the accreditation agency’s decision to accredit the school.130 The
court was willing to adopt a theory of FCA liability based on falsely obtaining accreditation, but
required more in terms of pleading than what the relator had provided. Specifically, the court
required the relator to include specific facts or statements made in the pleadings that were essential
to the school receiving or maintaining accreditation.131
In United States v. Sanford-Brown, Ltd.,132 the Seventh Circuit declined to follow the Ninth
Circuit’s approach to FCA liability in the context of Title IV funds.133 Sanford-Brown involved a
claim brought by a relator, the former Director of Education at the for-profit college, alleging that
staff, professors, administration, and ownership of the school had engaged in fraudulent conduct
regarding admission and retention of students in order to maintain Title IV funding.134 The relator
alleged violations of several federal regulations, including provisions that banned paying incentive
compensation, required maintenance of accreditation, prohibited harassing students to attend class,
and requiring students receiving Title IV funds to maintain a minimum GPA.135 The district court
found “no clear manifestation of congressional or regulatory intent to condition payment of Title
IV federal subsidies on compliance with the disputed Title IV [r]estrictions,” and granted summary
judgement in favor of the defendant.136
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The Seventh Circuit analyzed the relator’s claim based on two different theories of liability.
First, the court addressed the false record theory under section 3729(a)(1)(B) of the FCA, which
imposes liability when any party “knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false
record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim.”137 The court stated that to establish
liability under this section, a relator must prove: (1) defendant made a statement or record in order
to receive money from the government; (2) the statement or record was false; and (3) the defendant
knew it was false.138 The court held that to establish that a defendant knowingly used a false record,
the relator was required to establish the defendant’s mindset at the time of entry into the PPA. 139
The court further explained that promises of future performance do not become false due to
subsequent non-compliance, and to prove liability based on the false record theory a relator must
prove bad faith entry into the PPA.140
The court then looked at the relators claim based on a false presentment theory under
section 3729(a)(1)(A), which imposes liability on a party who “knowingly presents, or causes to
be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval.”141 The court articulated the
requirements under section 3729(a)(1)(A) as: (1) a false or fraudulent claim; (2) which defendant
presented, or caused to be presented, for payment; (3) with knowledge the claim was false.142 The
court rejected the relator’s argument, along with the government as amicus curiae, that certification
of compliance with Title IV restrictions upon entry into the PPA caused the presentment of false
or fraudulent claims for payment when the school subsequently violated conditions of the PPA.143
The court stated that according to the relator’s theory, a PPA “serves as a trigger poised to impose
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FCA liability at some indefinite point in the future, because continued lawful receipt of the federal
subsidies depends on continued compliance with the PPA.”144 The court held that FCA liability
does not result from non-compliance with Title IV restrictions following entry into a PPA unless
the relator proves fraudulent entry into the PPA.145 Because the relator failed to prove bad faith
entry into the initial PPA, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary
judgement in favor of the defendant.146
The Supreme Court granted a petition for writ of certiorari and vacated the Seventh
Circuit’s judgement in Sanford-Brown.147 The Court remanded the case to the Seventh Circuit for
further consideration in light of the Court’s decision in Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United
States ex rel. Escobar.148 In Universal Health, the Court held that the implied false certification
theory can be a basis for FCA liability “when a defendant submitting a claim makes specific
representations about the goods or services provided, but fails to disclose noncompliance with
material statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirements that make those representations
misleading with respect to those goods or services.”149
On remand, the Seventh Circuit interpreted the Court’s Universal Health holding to require
two conditions to be met for implied false certification: first, “the claim does not merely request
payment, but also makes specific representations about the goods or services provided,” 150 and
second, “the defendant’s failure to disclose noncompliance with material statutory, regulatory, or
contractual requirements makes those representations misleading half-truths.”151 The court noted
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that the only part of its prior decision that was affected by Universal Health was that which
addressed the false presentment claim under section 3729(a)(1)(A), which was based on a theory
of implied false certification.152 In reinstating its original decision granting summary judgement,
the Seventh Circuit found that neither condition was met in this case. 153 The court stated that the
relator offered no evidence showing that the defendant Sanford-Brown College made any
representations in connection with its claim for payment.154 Further, the court found that the relator
failed to establish the independent element of materiality because he offered no evidence that the
government’s decision to pay money to the college would have been different if the college’s
noncompliance with Title IV restrictions was disclosed.155
It appears that the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of the Universal Health holding’s effect
on Sanford-Brown is flawed for two reasons. First, in allowing students’ financial aid claims to
be submitted to the government, a college inherently represents that it is in compliance with the
initial requirements that made it eligible to receive government funding in the first place. As the
Supreme Court stated in Universal Health, “[a]nyone informed that a social worker at a . . . mental
health clinic provided a teenage patient with individual counseling services would probably—but
wrongly—conclude that the clinic had complied with core . . . Medicaid requirements.” 156
Similarly, anyone informed that a college was providing higher educational programs to students
who receive funding through federal programs would likely conclude that the school had complied
with HEA requirements. The Seventh Circuit focused on the fact that the claims submitted for
payment in Universal Health contained payment codes and provider identification numbers which

152

Id.
Id. at 447.
154
Id.
155
Id.
156
Universal Health, 136 S.Ct. at 2000.
153

21

corresponded to specific counseling services.157 The court stated that the college had not made any
representations in connection with its claim for payment.158 The court’s narrow interpretation of
what constitutes a “specific representation” is not warranted. The standard articulated by the
Supreme Court does not require representations made in addition to a claim for payment, but only
that specific representations are made through a claim requesting payment.159 Simply by allowing
students to submit claims for payment to the government, a college is representing that it is in
compliance with the requirements of Title IV and the PPA. The claim for payment is itself a
representation of compliance. Failing to disclose its noncompliance makes the representations
“misleading half-truths.”160
The second error in the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation was in finding that the independent
materiality element had not been met. The court correctly stated that the materiality requirement
is “rigorous” and “demanding,” and requires more than showing that “the Government would have
the option to decline to pay if it knew of the defendant’s noncompliance.” 161 But the court erred
in finding that the government’s decision to pay would not “likely or actually have been different”
if the government knew that the college was not in compliance with Title IV requirements. 162
Compliance with all statutory, regulatory, and contractual obligations contained in a PPA is a
prerequisite to obtaining federal funds under Title IV.163 Thus, had it been disclosed that the
college was violating certain requirements, the school would have likely lost its eligibility to
receive federal funding and the government would have denied payment.
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Despite these criticisms, the Seventh Circuit’s approach remains in tension with the Ninth
and Eleventh Circuit’s interpretations. Thus, it is unclear what theories are viable, and what
standards must be met, for bringing a valid cause of action against an educational institution under
the FCA. What is clear, however, is that the judicial decisions and legislative history show a
preference for extending FCA liability broadly. The predatory nature of some for-profit schools
and the current student loan crisis make higher educational institutions prime suspects for
committing fraudulent acts to secure federal funding. The current FCA lawsuit brought against
CSOL presents an interesting case involving false claims based on failure to maintain accreditation
standards. The case provides a good basis for extending FCA liability to educational institutions.
IV.

Applying FCA Liability to CSOL

Professor Bernier’s FCA lawsuit alleges that CSOL and Infilaw entered into the initial PPA
in bad faith and intended to defraud the federal government to falsely obtain Title IV funds.164 She
alleges that CSOL and Infilaw “knowingly violated Title IV of the HEA, its implementing
regulations . . ., and the PPA by making . . . fraudulent claims.” 165 She alleges that CSOL and
Infilaw are liable under the FCA under sections 3729(a)(1)(A), (B), and (C).166 Specifically, the
complaint alleges that CSOL and Infilaw violated ABA Rules by, among other things, admitting
academically underqualified students, failed to maintain accreditation standards set by the ABA
(in violation of Title IV), recertified students as having made satisfactory progress when they had
not, and, in advertising job placement rates, engaged in misleading practices by failing to disclose
that graduates were “employed” by the law school to study for the bar exam.167

164

Complaint, supra note 13, at ¶¶ 96–106.
Id. at ¶ 100.
166
Id. at ¶¶ 95–118.
167
Id. at ¶ 100.
165

23

Under the express false certification theory as applied by the Ninth Circuit and expressly
adopted by the Eleventh Circuit, it appears that the complaint states a valid cause of action under
the FCA because the relator has adequately alleged facts showing a fraudulent course of conduct
causing the government to pay out money it did not owe. 168 But even if it is found that the
complaint does not meet the heightened pleading standard because it only generally alleges bad
faith entry into the PPA without sufficient particularity under that theory, the court should extend
the Supreme Court’s articulation of the implied false certification theory in Universal Health to
allow the case to proceed.
A. Express False Certification
The Eleventh Circuit expressly adopted the false certification theory of FCA liability for
educational institutions in Urquilla-Diaz.169 To meet the heightened pleading requirements of Rule
9(b), a relator must allege specific facts about the time, place, and substance of the fraud,
particularly, “the details of the defendants’ allegedly fraudulent acts, when they occurred, and who
engaged in them.”170 While the Seventh Circuit requires a showing of fraudulent entry into a PPA
for express false certification,171 the Eleventh Circuit has applied false certification to claims based
on fraudulent conduct committed after entering the PPA.172
In the complaint filed against CSOL and Infilaw, Professor Bernier alleges that the
defendants entered into the initial PPA in bad faith with the intent to defraud the government.173
But the complaint fails to include any factual allegations concerning the circumstances around the
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party’s entry into the PPA.174 Professor Bernier did not begin teaching at CSOL until 2013,175 and
thus was not present at the school when the PPA was signed. She failed to provide any information
that would provide an indicia of reliability concerning the formation of the PPA.176 Therefore, it
seems that the complaint would fail to meet the heightened standard of Rule 9(b) particularity. In
the Eleventh Circuit’s view,177 however, it seems the court will either “imply” fraudulent entry into
the PPA based on fraudulent conduct committed after formation, or not require it at all. While the
Eleventh Circuit’s view directly conflicts with the Seventh Circuit’s bad faith entry requirement,178
the Eleventh Circuit’s view is more consistent with the FCA’s purposes in combatting fraud
against the government. In the Seventh Circuit’s view, a school could conceivably initially enter
a PPA in good faith, then later decide to perpetuate a fraudulent scheme to obtain federal funds,
and escape liability under the FCA. This idea conflicts with the legislative and judicial preference
to extend liability broadly. In entering the PPA, a school expressly certifies it will comply with
all requirements, and subsequent knowledge or purposeful noncompliance is sufficient to find a
defendant liable under the express false certification theory. 179
The complaint does allege specific factual allegations pertaining to fraudulent conduct
committed after entering the PPA, specifically relating to student admissions and certifications of
satisfactory progress.180 ABA Rule 501(b) mandates that a school must not admit applicants who
do not appear capable of satisfactorily completing the program of study and being admitted to the
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bar.181 Additionally, ABA Rule 205(b) requires academically underqualified students to be
admitted only if approved by the dean and faculty of the law school. 182 Under ABA rules, the
number of underqualified students admitted through conditional admission or an alternate
admission program must not exceed ten percent of the class.183 The Bernier complaint alleges
generally that academically underqualified students were admitted and states the school’s low
LSAT scores compared to other schools.184 The complaint further alleges specific facts suggesting
that the school knew the students were unqualified and would have a low probability of success in
law school. For instance, the relator alleges that during a faculty meeting in the spring of 2015,
the CSOL Director of Bar Preparation stated that students being admitted to the school would have
only a twenty-five percent chance of passing the bar exam.185
Additionally, the relator alleges that the school made re-certifications of academically
underqualified students as having made satisfactory progress as a condition for the continued
receipt of federal financial aid.186 In order to remain eligible under Title IV and continue receiving
educational funding, a student must be making “satisfactory progress.”187 The complaint states
that CSOL President Chidi Ogene summarily adjusted the minimum passing GPA requirement
down to 1.50 in order to retain students who otherwise should have failed.188 The complaint
contains specific facts that the GPA adjustment allowed the school to retain sixty-five students
who should have been dismissed.189 Further, the relator alleges that during a February 2016 faculty
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meeting, Dean Conison stated that President Ogene took these actions because “the company
[Infilaw] could not tolerate the financial loss or harm to its reputation.”190
These specific factual allegations of fraudulent conduct showing the school knowingly
violated requirements in order to receive Title IV funds sufficiently meet the heightened pleading
requirements to state a claim under the FCA as applied by the Eleventh Circuit. The standard for
showing an FCA violation based on false certification requires: (1) a false statement or fraudulent
course of conduct, (2) made with scienter, (3) that was material, causing (4) the government to pay
out money or forfeit moneys due.191 The factual allegations contained in the complaint establish a
fraudulent course of conduct to meet the first requirement. Additionally, the complaint contains
sufficient particularity in providing specific dates, numbers of students, and conversations with
administrators for which Bernier was present to establish the indicia of reliability that Rule 9(b)
requires.192 Scienter may be alleged generally,193 and Bernier alleges that CSOL engaged in the
fraudulent conduct in order to obtain federal funds.194 Further, the fraudulent conduct is material
because if CSOL disclosed its noncompliance with Title IV requirements, it likely would have lost
its eligibility to receive federal funds. Finally, the conduct caused the government to pay out
money it otherwise would not have in the form of student financial aid. Therefore, the allegations
in Professor Bernier’s complaint sufficiently state a claim of FCA violations against CSOL.
B. Implied False Certification
Even if the complaint fails to plead a viable claim under an express false certification
theory, the court should extend liability under the implied false certification theory as articulated
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by the Supreme Court in Universal Health.195 Under that standard two conditions must be met: (1)
the claim makes specific representations about the goods or services provided, and (2) failure to
disclose noncompliance with material statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirements make
those representations misleading half-truths.196 Both conditions are met under the facts of this case.
By continuing to participate in Title IV programs and in reaffirming its duties, obligations, and
promises under the PPA annually, the school made specific representations that it was complying
with all requirements. Additionally, by failing to disclose noncompliance the school made material
misrepresentations for the purpose of receiving funds the government would not otherwise be
required to pay. The failure to disclose is material because compliance with all requirements of
the PPA is a prerequisite to obtaining funding. While the Supreme Court’s holding was limited to
the healthcare context, the court should extend implied false certification liability to educational
institutions in this context. CSOL should be found liable for submitting claims for payment after
knowingly breaking its promises and obligations under the PPA.
V.

Conclusion

Assuming the truth of the allegations in the complaint, FCA liability should be extended to
CSOL for failing to maintain proper procedures, knowingly or intentionally, and causing millions
of dollars to be paid out in student loans. The predatory nature of some for-profit educational
institutions is drastically adding to the current student loan crisis faced by students in the United
States. Policy concerns demand holding the responsible parties liable. The extended period that
CSOL was able to continue operating and benefitting from student loan payments it otherwise
should not have received shows that accreditation agencies are not well equipped to combat against
this sort of activity. The FCA should be utilized against educational institutions that knowingly
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fail to maintain accreditation and other standards in order to deter the predatory practices of forprofit universities.
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